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BURNING A HOLE IN THE POCKET OF 
JUSTICE: PROP. 66’S UNDERFUNDED 
ATTEMPT TO FIX CALIFORNIA’S DEATH 
PENALTY 
Flavia Costea*
          California has struggled with the administrative and financial 
burdens of a flawed death penalty system for decades. In an effort to save 
the death penalty, the voters of California enacted Proposition 66, which 
promised to deliver a quicker and more cost-effective system. This Article 
focuses on the provision of Prop. 66 that expands the number of lawyers 
who can act as defense lawyers for inmates on death row. While this 
provision superficially seems to solve the shortage of defense attorneys 
willing to take on death penalty cases, without significant funding, the 
shortage of resources and pressure to speed up executions may lead to 
significant constitutional violations. This Article proposes solutions that 
emphasize a cost-benefit analysis and considers public policy concerns 
for the future of the death penalty in California. 
  
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to the editors 
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their help in editing this Article. Thank you, 
also, to Professor Sam Pillsbury for his guidance and support. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The death penalty in California is fundamentally broken. The 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice has 
estimated that a death sentence in California costs almost twelve times 
more than a sentence of life without parole.1 Keeping an inmate on 
death row rather than placing the inmate in a maximum security prison 
for life without parole costs an additional $90,000 per year.2 For the 
current 740 inmates on death row in California,3 this adds up to an 
additional $63.3 million annually.4 Despite the death penalty’s 
significant administrative and financial burdens, California has only 
executed thirteen inmates since 1978.5 This means that, on average, 
California spends $190 million every three years to complete one 
execution.6 
Six years ago, in a careful cost study, the late Judge Alarcón of 
the Ninth Circuit revealed the financial burden that the death penalty 
has imposed on the state and implored California to “mend or end” its 
death penalty system.7 Instead, voters enacted Proposition 66 (“Prop. 
66”) in November 2016.8 Deemed the “Death Penalty Reform and 
Savings Act,” voters were lured in by what seemed like an attractive 
solution to a deeply flawed system. Prop. 66 sounds great on paper: it 
promises fewer appeals, more money donated to victims’ families, 
streamlined court processes, a mandatory five-year timeframe, and a 
mechanism to force more lawyers to take on death penalty cases and 
eliminate the backlog on death row.9 Voters’ support for Prop. 66 is 
 
 1. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 147 (Gerald Uelmen & 
Chris Boscia eds., 2008), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https:// 
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1000&context=ncippubs. 
 2. Id. at 146. 
 3. Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year. 
 4. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 146. 
 5. Evan Wagstaff, Here Are the 13 Men Executed by California Since 1978, L.A. TIMES 
(July 16, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://graphics.latimes.com/towergraphic-see-13-men-executed-
california-1978. 
 6. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 141. 
 7. See Judge Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A 
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty 
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S42 (2011). 
 8. California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_66,_Death_Penalty_Procedures_(2016) (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2018). 
 9. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
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understandable. The public was tired and frustrated with incurring the 
costs of a death penalty system, without any of the proffered benefits 
of one. The unfortunate reality, however, is that Prop. 66 does not 
“mend” the death penalty system. It ignores many practical realities of 
the judicial system. These unheeded problems will either make Prop. 
66 completely ineffectual in speeding up the death penalty or, succeed, 
while compromising accuracy and constitutionality within the 
California death penalty system. 
The provision of Prop. 66 that seeks to expand the number of 
lawyers working on death penalty cases is particularly misguided and 
will likely have little effect on speeding up executions. If the 
California courts and the legislature succumb to the pressure of trying 
to make Prop. 66 effective without more resources, they will likely be 
forced to lower the standards for death penalty defense counsel. That 
may cause Prop. 66 to actually prolong appeals, due to a potential of a 
flood of Sixth and Eighth Amendment challenges. 
Part II of this Article will first trace the history of California’s 
voter initiative process, how Prop. 66 materialized, and the history of 
the death penalty in both the United States Supreme Court and 
California. Then, Part III will argue that Prop. 66 will likely be 
ineffectual and will force the California judiciary to lower the 
qualifications for death penalty defense counsel, which will cause an 
influx of constitutional appeals. Finally, Part IV will propose 
solutions, and Part V will discuss justifications for those proposals and 
important public policy concerns that should be considered. 
II.  CALIFORNIA’S TROUBLED HISTORY WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 
Despite its problems, Prop. 66 passed through the ballot due to 
California’s unique voter initiative process. It was written in an 
attempt to “save” the death penalty through a series of reforms, rather 
than repealing the punishment completely.10 The dysfunctional state 
of California’s death penalty system is the result of a long history of 
uncertainty concerning the death penalty in the United States Supreme 
Court combined with the conflicting California state judiciary and 
legislature. Since the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court has 
 
 10. John J. Donohue III, Q&A with John Donohue About Prop 66, STAN. L. SCH. LEGAL 
AGGREGATE BLOG (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/01/qa-with-john-donohue-about-Prop-66/. 
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debated the constitutionality of the death penalty, often under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and California has mirrored it.11 
A.  A History of Prop. 66 and California’s Unique 
Voter Initiative System 
California is unique in that its voter initiative system allows for 
one of the most direct forms of democracy in the United States.12 
While this method may seem beneficial in many respects, there is an 
inherent danger that the civilian groups who write these ballot 
measures do not always have the necessary specialized knowledge of 
elected legislators. In many ways, Prop. 66 reflects the flaws of 
California’s voter initiative process and lacks an accurate appreciation 
of how the judicial system in California functions. 
1.  Voter Initiatives in California 
The voter initiative process has a deep-rooted history in 
California. It was adopted in 1911 during a time when the California 
legislature was heavily influenced by railroad monopolies.13 Citizens 
and other business owners were crippled by legislation that largely 
ignored the will of the voters and focused on benefitting the monopoly 
of railroads.14 
In response to this government abuse, Hiram Johnson, the 
governor of California at the time, enacted the voter initiative program 
so that citizens could be heard again.15 A voter initiative obviates the 
need for approval from the governor or legislature and instead is a 
proposition submitted directly to the voters.16 To make it onto the 
ballot, an initiative must start as a petition that is submitted to the 
 
 11. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 
880, 883 (Cal. 1972). 
 12. Hillel Aron, How California’s Ballot Measure Process Got So Kooky, LA WEEKLY 
(Oct. 22, 2016, 7:47 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-californias-ballot-measure-
process-got-so-kooky-7526677. 
 13. J. FRED SILVA, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: 
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 1 (2000), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_1100FSOP.pdf. 
 14. See id. 
 15. John Myers, As Major Reform of California’s Initiative Process Nears Its Anniversary, 
the Record Is Mixed, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 24, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-
pol-ca-road-map-initiative-overhaul-record-20180624-story.html. 
 16. Ballot Initiatives, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: XAVIER BECERRA, ATTORNEY GEN., 
https://oag.ca.gov/initiatives (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
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California Attorney General.17 The petition must then gain a minimum 
number of signatures, equal to 8% of registered voters if the 
proposition seeks to alter the California Constitution, or 5% if it seeks 
to alter a statute.18 Currently, the minimum number of signatures is 
585,407 or 365,880.19 Once the signatures are acquired, the legislature 
does not have the ability to alter the text of the initiative.20 Once on 
the ballot, the proposition must gain more than 50% of the vote to 
pass.21 
During the era when the voter initiative was created, it saved the 
California citizens from oppressive monopoly control.22 The problem, 
however, is that the voter initiative system has stayed largely the same 
since that time, while political complexities have increased and the 
need for stemming monopolistic control by direct initiative has 
decreased. What we have today is a system that does not require a 
sufficient amount of deliberation before an initiative is on the ballot. 
Unlike legislation, which goes through a robust vetting process, ballot 
initiatives can change the legal and political landscape in California 
before enough thought has been put into the propositions. The result 
is often an ill-advised proposition that has not properly weighed the 
ramifications and practical consequences of its enactment. 
2.  Tracing Prop. 66’s Origins 
Prop. 66 was written in part by the pro-death penalty 
organization, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.23 It was on the ballot 
in November 2016 alongside Proposition 62, which proposed to repeal 
the death penalty in California completely.24 Prop. 66 passed with a 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). 
 19. How to Qualify an Initiative, ALEX PADILLA, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/how-qualify-initiative/ (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2018). 
 20. Aron, supra note 12. 
 21. SILVA, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
 22. History of Initiative and Referendum in California, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/History_of_Initiative_and_Referendum_in_California (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2018). 
 23. Maura Dolan, Executions Could Resume After California Supreme Court Leaves Most of 
Proposition 66 Intact, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017, 3:25 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-death-penalty-decision-prop-66-20170824-
story.html. 
 24. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
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51.3% majority, while hopes of putting an end to capital punishment 
with Proposition 62 faded into the distance with 46.1% of the vote.25 
Prop. 66 is dubbed the “Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act 
of 2016” and, in its essence, puts in a fast-track to lethal injections and 
“streamlines” death penalty procedures.26 It amends the California 
Penal Code and Government Code to change appeal procedures, 
assign the superior courts sole jurisdiction over capital appeal 
petitions, establish a five-year time limit for review, allow death row 
inmate transfers among California prisons, increase the amount of 
inmate wages that are paid in restitution to the victims’ families, and 
exempt prison officials from regulations for developing execution 
methods.27 Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, Prop. 66 
also requires attorneys on the California Court-Appointed Counsel list 
to take on death penalty cases if they wish to remain on the 
appointment list.28 Specifically, Prop. 66 adds the following text to 
California Penal Code section 1239.1: 
When necessary to remove a substantial backlog in 
appointment of counsel for capital cases, the Supreme Court 
shall require attorneys who are qualified for appointment to 
the most serious non-capital appeals and who meet the 
qualifications for capital appeals to accept appointment in 
capital cases as a condition for remaining on the court’s 
appointment list. A “substantial backlog” exists for this 
purpose when the time from entry of judgment in the trial 
court to appointment of counsel for appeal exceeds 6 months 
over a period of 12 consecutive months.29 
Recently, in Briggs v. Brown,30 the California Supreme Court 
upheld the majority of Prop. 66, aside from holding that its five-year 
 
 25. Jazmine Ulloa & Julie Westfall, California Voters Approve an Effort to Speed up the Death 
Penalty with Prop. 66, L.A. TIMES: ESSENTIAL POLITICS (Nov. 22, 2016, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-proposition-66-
death-penalty-passes-1479869920-htmlstory.html. 
 26. San Diego Union-Trib. Editorial Board, Why California Should End, Not Streamline, the 
Death Penalty, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
 http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/endorsements/sd-yes-on-prop-62-no-on-prop-66-
story.html. 
 27. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
 28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239.1(b); Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
 29. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
 30. 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017). 
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time limit was “directive” instead of mandatory.31 Although the Briggs 
opinion did not address the attorney appointment section of Prop. 66 
in detail, the language continuously hints at the court’s lack of 
optimism as to whether the proposition will effectively fulfill its goal 
of speeding up executions.32 
The California Rules of Court provide a list of requirements for 
death penalty attorneys in order to “promote adequate representation 
in death penalty cases.”33 To be lead counsel, these include ten years 
of criminal law litigation experience, and experience as lead counsel 
in: 
 (A) At least 10 serious or violent felony jury trials, 
including at least 2 murder cases, tried to argument, verdict, 
or final judgment; or 
 (B) At least 5 serious or violent felony jury trials, including 
at least 3 murder cases, tried to argument, verdict, or final 
judgment; 
(4) Be familiar with the practices and procedures of the 
California criminal courts; 
(5) Be familiar with and experienced in the use of expert 
witnesses and evidence, including psychiatric and forensic 
evidence; 
(6) Have completed within two years before appointment at 
least 15 hours of capital case defense training approved for 
Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit by the State 
Bar of California; and 
(7) Have demonstrated the necessary proficiency, diligence, 
and quality of representation appropriate to capital cases.34 
These stringent qualifications contrast with the rule for appointed 
counsel in non-capital appeals. The qualifications of appointed 
counsel here are largely up to the courts of appeal’s indigent defense 
projects.35 The court rules simply state: 
 
 31. Id. at 34. 
 32. Id. at 61. 
 33. CAL. R. CT. 4.117. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Court-Appointed Counsel Program, CAL. CTS: THE JUD. BRANCH OF CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/4201.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
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In matching counsel with the demands of the case, the Court 
of Appeal should consider: (1) The length of the sentence; 
(2) The complexity or novelty of the issues; (3) The length 
of the trial and of the reporter’s transcript; and (4) Any 
questions concerning the competence of trial counsel.36 
There are six appellate projects in California, one of which is devoted 
solely to capital appointments, and the rest of which are devoted to 
noncapital appointments.37 Under the authority of the California 
Courts of Appeal and California Rules of Court, rule 8.300, the 
projects maintain various lists of attorneys qualified for appointment 
to cases depending on a case’s difficulty. The criteria or procedures 
for the separation of these lists is not available to the public and, from 
the broad language of Rule 8.300, it seems that the rules are largely up 
to the discretion of the appellate projects rather than a statutory, 
publicly available standard. 
B.  The Evolution of the Death Penalty in the United States 
Supreme Court and Its Effect on California 
The death penalty has a long and tumultuous history in America 
and California. Death penalty statutes have existed in California since 
it joined the Union in 1850.38 Between 1893 and 1967 a total of 502 
felons were executed, averaging almost seven executions a year.39 The 
executions immediately ceased, however, during the United States 
Supreme Court’s “de facto moratorium” on capital punishment 
between 1967–1977.40 During this time the Supreme Court debated 
the constitutionality of the death penalty, and several seminal capital 
punishment cases emerged. 
1.  The United States Supreme Court’s Emerging 
Jurisprudence on the Death Penalty 
Modern United States Supreme Court jurisprudence can be 
summarized into three main categories: the period prior to Furman, 
 
 36. CAL. R. CT. 8.300. 
 37. Appellate Projects, CAL. CTS: THE JUD. BRANCH OF CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/13714.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 38. John H. Culver & Chantel Boyens, Political Cycles of Life and Death: Capital Punishment 
as Public Policy in California, 65 ALB. L. REV. 991, 995 (2002). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 991–92. 
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when juries were given complete discretion to decide when a death 
sentence should be imposed, the Furman period, when the Supreme 
Court stopped all executions, and the Gregg period when executions 
were allowed to begin again.  
a.  The pre-Furman Era 
Only one year prior to the national death penalty standstill caused 
by Furman, the United States Supreme Court decided McGautha v. 
California.41 In McGautha, two petitioners, one from California and 
one from Ohio, appealed their death sentences and argued that, among 
other issues, the death penalty was unconstitutional because juries 
lacked any governing standards of when to impose a death sentence.42 
In McGautha’s trial, the jury instructions stated that, “in determining 
which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely free to act 
according to your own judgment, conscience, and absolute 
discretion.”43 Petitioners argued that such a “fundamentally lawless” 
method of imposing the death penalty violated their right to due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.44 
The Court, however, was not persuaded by their argument. Justice 
Harlan, in his majority opinion, cited various sources of history and a 
wide swath of cases, which asserted that, in order for the death penalty 
to work, its imposition should remain solely up to the discretion of the 
jury and death eligible crimes could not be confined to finite 
categories.45 Justice Harlan further reasoned that the “infinite variety 
of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either 
meaningless ‘boiler-plate’ or a statement of the obvious that no jury 
would need.”46 Thus, the Court rejected the notion that a lack of 
governing standards for death penalty sentences violated anything in 
the Constitution.47 
 
 41. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g granted, vacated by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972). 
 42. Id. at 196. 
 43. Id. at 189–90. 
 44. Id. at 196. 
 45. Id. at 183–197. 
 46. Id. at 208. 
 47. Id. at 207. 
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b.  The Furman Era 
The sentiment in McGautha dissipated quickly, as the very next 
year the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia48 
and overturned McGautha.49 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that 
the death penalty violated the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause 
of the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because of the largely arbitrary and discriminatory 
fashion with which it was being carried out within the states.50 The 
case concerned three black men sentenced to death, one on the basis 
of felony murder and the other two on the basis of rape.51 As part of 
the unusual per curiam opinion in which each Justice wrote a separate 
concurrence, Justice Stewart wrote, 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way 
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all 
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, 
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among 
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the 
sentence of death has in fact been imposed.52 
The case struck down death penalty schemes in all states until the 
schemes could be amended to alleviate the arbitrary nature with which 
they were being applied. During this time, states worked towards 
revising their death penalty statutes in an effort to make them fairer 
and more even-handed in application. 
c.  The Gregg Era 
Gregg v. Georgia53 then gave new life to the penalty. The 
Supreme Court affirmed petitioner Troy Gregg’s death sentence for 
the murder and armed robbery of two men who had picked up Gregg 
and his companion, Floyd Allen, as hitchhikers.54 Gregg was found 
guilty and sentenced to death under Georgia’s revised death penalty 
statutes.55 The jury was instructed that in order to give a death 
 
 48. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 49. Id. at 239–40. 
 50. Id. at 239–40 (1972). 
 51. Id. at 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 53. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 54. Id. at 207. 
 55. Id. at 161. 
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sentence, one of the following three aggravating factors must be 
found: 
One[:] That the offense of murder was committed while the 
offender was engaged in the commission of two other capital 
felonies, to-wit the armed robbery of [Simmons and Moore]. 
 
Two[:] That the offender committed the offense of murder 
for the purpose of receiving money and the automobile 
described in the indictment. 
 
Three[:] The offense of murder was outrageously and 
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman, in that they [sic] 
involved the depravity of [the] mind of the defendant.56 
The jury found that the first two aggravating factors had been met.57 
The Supreme Court then held that Georgia’s revised death penalty 
statutes eliminated the arbitrariness that worried the Court in Furman, 
with the addition of its “aggravating factors” that were now required 
in order to impose a death sentence.58 It was believed that by requiring 
a seemingly objective set of circumstances to impose the death 
penalty, juries would necessarily be more consistent in their 
sentencing.59 After Gregg was handed down, as long as a state adopted 
their own list of aggravating factors that were similar to Georgia’s, 
they were permitted to start executions again. 
2.  California’s Own Difficulties with the Death Penalty 
California was substantially affected by this uncertain period for 
the death penalty in the United States Supreme Court, and similarly 
went through several cycles of deciding if and how the death penalty 
should be carried out. On February 18, 1972, in People v. Anderson,60 
the California Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty violated 
Article 1, Section 6 of the California Constitution, which forbids 
“cruel or unusual punishment,” and stated that capital punishment in 
 
 56. Id. at 161. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 197. 
 59. Id. at 206–07. 
 60. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
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California “offend[ed] contemporary standards of decency.”61 The 
California Supreme Court seemed to have missed the mark on their 
estimation of “contemporary standards,” however, as voters quickly 
reenacted the death penalty just later that year by passing ballot 
measure Proposition 17.62 
Proposition 17 (“Prop. 17”) amended the California Constitution 
by adding Section 27 to Article 1, which put into force all death 
penalty statutes and stated: 
The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not 
be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or 
unusual punishments within the meaning of Article I, 
Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be 
deemed to contravene any other provision of this 
constitution.63 
In the wake of Prop. 17, the state legislature had to figure out a 
practical way to implement a new statutory scheme that was also 
within the confines of Furman and Gregg.64 The legislature in 
California did this by adopting a series of aggravating factors into the 
death penalty statutes, similar to the ones Georgia adopted in Gregg, 
as to eliminate the potential for arbitrary application of the death 
penalty.65 However, during the same time that the states were adopting 
the aggravating factors framework, the Supreme Court decided a 
number of cases that held the new statutory frameworks were 
unconstitutional because they did not allow for juries to hear 
mitigating evidence which could potentially bring the sentence down 
to life without parole.66 Thus, the California Supreme Court struck 
down the new framework, and the legislature had to start again.67 
The statute was yet again revised, this time allowing juries to hear 
evidence which would support a life in prison sentence instead of a 
death sentence, and only allowed a death sentence to be considered if 
 
 61. Id. at 891. 
 62. Proposition 17 (1972) added Section 27 to Article I of the California Constitution. CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1000. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 303–04 (1976). 
 67. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1000. 
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“special circumstances” were present.68 These special circumstances 
included murder for financial gain, murder of a police officer or 
witness in a trial, and murder in the commission of rape, lewd acts 
with a child, or by particularly “cruel or atrocious” means.69 
a.  The Bird Era 
Over the next few years, with Justice Bird as the head of the 
California Supreme Court, the court slowly chiseled away at Prop. 17. 
Among the decisions during this period, the California Supreme Court 
overturned many death sentences by allegedly ignoring the harmless 
error doctrine, finding almost no trial error too small to merit reversal 
of a death sentence.70 Additionally, they held that the “cruel and 
atrocious” circumstances standard was too vague and that a 
defendant’s intent to kill or to aid in a killing was required.71 The 
tendency towards reversal in death sentence cases during the Bird 
Court caused much public discontent among capital punishment 
supporters, which at the time was the majority of the California 
population. In 1986, voters refused to reelect Justices Bird, Grodin, 
and Reynoso, three of the most liberal and anti-death penalty justices 
on the California Supreme Court at the time.72 For the first time in 
California history, three spots were open on the California Supreme 
Court in one election.73 
b.  The Lucas Era 
The governor at the time of these vacancies, George Deukmejian, 
was a conservative and a proponent of the death penalty.74 The three 
vacancies on the California Supreme Court gave him the opportunity 
to nominate more conservative justices who would carry out his pro-
death penalty agenda.75 While the death penalty was touted as the 
primary reason for removing the three liberal justices from the 
 
 68. People v. Davis, 633 P.2d 186, 193–95 (Cal. 1981). 
 69. John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment: The Original Understanding 
of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 354–56, 400–02, 407 (1990). 
 70. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1002. 
 71. Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983); People v. Engert, 647 P.2d 76, 78 
(Cal. 1982). 
 72. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1003. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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California Supreme Court, there were also other political forces at 
play. Four conservative political groups raised $5.6 million in the 
campaign against the Bird Court.76 These groups convinced supporters 
that the Bird Court had to be overthrown because it was ignoring the 
will of the voters by refusing to execute anyone.77 The underlying 
motive for removing the three liberal justices, however, was likely to 
obtain a conservative majority on the court so that it reflected the 
newly elected conservative government.78 The Bird Court was often 
accused of being anti-business, which is likely why large oil and 
insurance companies contributed substantial donations to the 
campaign against them.79 
Justice Lucas was appointed as Chief to fill Bird’s position, and 
over the years, the California Supreme Court completely reversed its 
tendency towards reversal on death-penalty sentences. Harmless error 
often precluded reversals, and the intent to kill requirement recently 
instated by the Bird Court was reversed.80 
For a period, in the aftermath of the Bird Court, it seemed as 
though the opinions of both the public and the California Supreme 
Court were finally aligned.81 However, it was not until 1992 that the 
first person was executed in California after the enactment of the 1977 
laws.82 Since then, only nine others have been executed,83 despite the 
fact that 740 prisoners remain on death row.84 Since the end of the 
Bird Court, California’s death penalty statutes have largely remained 
the same, aside from the addition of death penalty sentences for 
accomplices who played a major role in the murder and the elimination 
of the gas chamber in favor of the lethal injection.85 
 
 76. Id.  
 77. Tom Wicker, In the Nation; A Naked Power Grab, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/14/opinion/in-the-nation-a-naked-power-grab.html; Patrick K. 
Brown, The Rise and Fall of Rose Bird: A Career Killed by the Death Penalty, CAL. SUP. CT. HIST. 
SOC’Y (2007), https://www.cschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/CSCHS_2007-Brown.pdf. 
 78. See Wicker, supra note 77; Brown, supra note 77. 
 79. Wicker, supra note 77. 
 80. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1004. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1005. 
 83. Id. at 1006. 
 84. Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2018), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year. 
 85. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1006–08. 
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This flip-flopping over the constitutionality of the death penalty 
reflects a conflict between the legislature, the judiciary, and the 
California voters. Recent litigation over Prop. 66 is no different. 
Briggs v. Brown, the recent litigation over the constitutionality of 
“mandatory” five-year period to adjudicate appeals in Prop. 66,86 is 
reminiscent of the same dance that has been going on between the 
California Supreme Court and the state legislature since the 1960s. 
III.  PROP 66 WILL LOWER QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTED 
COUNSEL AND IN TURN RAISE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
VIOLATIONS 
Prop. 66’s provision on appointed counsel will likely have no 
effect in speeding up executions and may also cause a severe 
degradation in the quality of death penalty representation. Threatening 
attorneys who are on California’s various appointment lists to take on 
death penalty cases will inevitably result in the appointment of 
unqualified attorneys and an increased likelihood of violating the 
objectively reasonable standard for effective representation required 
under the Sixth Amendment.87 In turn, as there is already a national 
problem with the quality of defense attorneys in death penalty cases,88 
Prop. 66 will also potentially increase the arbitrary nature with which 
death sentences are handed down and create a new Furman-like 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.89 
A.  There Is No Indication of a Group of Capital Appeal Qualified 
Attorneys Who Are Simultaneously on the Appointment List and Not 
Taking on Death Penalty Cases 
There is serious doubt that Prop. 66’s attorney appointment 
provision will have a meaningful effect if the legislature leaves it as 
is. To reiterate, Prop. 66 requires that the California “Supreme Court 
shall require attorneys who are qualified for appointment to the most 
serious non-capital appeals and who meet the qualifications for capital 
 
 86. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017). 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–92 (1984). 
 88. Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard 
of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (1993). 
 89. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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appeals to accept appointment in capital cases as a condition for 
remaining on the court’s appointment list.”90 
This provision assumes that there is a universe of attorneys in 
California that are qualified for capital appeals yet refuse to take these 
cases on. The qualifications require that attorneys have done “at least 
15 hours of capital case defense training approved for Minimum 
Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California” 
within two years before appointment.91 It defies logic to assume that 
there are large numbers of attorneys in California taking specialized 
capital defense training every two years, and who are meeting all the 
other qualifications under California Rules of Court, rule 4.117, yet 
refuse to take on capital appeals. Approved capital defense training is 
not a requirement for any other type of court appointment,92 therefore 
it would be irrational to assume that attorneys would be participating 
in specialized training for a type of case that they were going to refuse 
to take in the end. 
If the group of attorneys hypothesized by Prop. 66 does not exist 
in any meaningful number, the attorney appointment provision of 
Prop. 66 will fail to have any significant impact on its goal of speeding 
up executions. This is an example of how Prop. 66 was crafted without 
a full understanding of the details and realities of the modern legal 
field. If the attorney appointment provision of Prop. 66 proves to be 
ineffective and the mandatory five-year period has already been 
discredited,93 there is little hope left that the remaining provisions will 
make a meaningful impact on the speed of executions. 
B.  California Will Likely Be Forced to Lower Capital Appeal 
Qualifications in Order to Effectuate the Goals of Prop. 66 
As it is unlikely that there will be many lawyers who are 
legitimately qualified for capital appeals and have not already taken 
on death penalty cases, the legislature is bound to explicitly or 
implicitly lower the qualifications for appointed defense counsel 
because of the pressure to effectuate the purpose of Prop. 66. 
 
 90. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (emphasis added). 
 91. CAL. R. CT. 4.117. 
 92. See CAL. R. CT. 8.300. 
 93. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 59 (Cal. 2017). 
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1.  Explicitly Lowering Capital Appeal Qualifications 
Faced with the responsibility of effectuating the will of the voters 
under Prop. 66, the courts and the legislature may do this by lowering 
the qualifications for court appointed counsel under California Rules 
of Court, rule 4.117.94 Doing this would expand the number of 
attorneys who could qualify to represent death row inmates, but, at the 
same time, it would open a floodgate of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 
The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which 
sought to establish a national standard of qualifications for capital 
attorneys, stressed that: 
[t]he language [of the guidelines] has been amended to call 
for “high quality legal representation” to emphasize that, 
because of the extraordinary complexity and demands of 
capital cases, a significantly greater degree of skill and 
experience on the part of defense counsel is required than in 
a noncapital case.  
. . . . 
[D]eath penalty cases have become so specialized that 
defense counsel have duties and functions definably different 
from those of counsel in ordinary criminal cases.95 
While courts are not required to use the ABA guidelines as 
“inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel ‘must 
fully comply,’”96 the guidelines provide clear evidence of the 
prevailing expectations and norms of defense counsel after the 
guidance of cases regarding the effective assistance of counsel 
standard under the Sixth Amendment left much to be desired.97 These 
guidelines outline some of the unique issues that death penalty 
attorneys must grapple with. It is difficult to imagine that these issues 
will be handled well by attorneys who historically have avoided 
 
 94. CAL. R. CT. 4.117. 
 95. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 921, 923 (2003) (emphasis 
added). 
 96. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8 (2009). 
 97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
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handling death penalty cases, or attorneys who only meet the 
potentially lower qualifications for death penalty attorneys. 
Thus, when the legislature and the California Supreme Court 
realize that there is still a lack of qualified attorneys under the current 
statutory standards, there will be pressure from the population to do 
something in order to bridge this gap. It is likely that this will come in 
the form of new, lower standards for death penalty defense counsel. 
In contemplating whether it wants to chip away at the minimum 
standards of qualification and performance for death penalty defense 
attorneys, California should consider that lower qualifications are 
directly correlated with below average performance in death penalty 
cases and be informed by the cautionary lessons which have emerged 
from the aptly named “Death Belt.” The Death Belt is comprised of 
nine southeastern states that account for 90% of executions in the 
United States.98 Unsurprisingly, these states have historically had 
some of the lowest qualifications for death penalty defense counsel 
and have had some of the most shocking accounts of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during death penalty cases.99 A recent study 
showed that attorneys in the Death Belt who represented death row 
inmates were disciplined and/or disbarred by the ABA three to forty-
six more times than average attorneys for those states.100 
Additionally, out of the 164 people who have been found innocent 
and exonerated before execution on death row, only five came from 
California.101 Seventy-nine have come from the Death Belt, meaning, 
on average, states in the Death Belt were almost twice as likely to 
sentence an innocent person to death when compared to California.102 
This shows that the measures taken to ensure accurate verdicts in 
California, more so than other states, have been successful so far and 
are vital in continuing this accuracy. The United States, and the Death 
Belt in particular, has seen the cost that comes with shortcutting these 
 
 98. The nine states that comprise the Death Belt are Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia, 
Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Peter Wagner, NYC Film: 
Fighting for Life in the Death-Belt, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 3, 2006), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2006/10/03/deathbelt. 
 99. The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 1923, 1924–25 (1994). 
 100. Id. at 1925. 
 101. The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-
list-those-freed-death-row (last updated Apr. 19, 2018). 
 102. See id. 
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measures. The lives of 164 innocent people were almost ended due to 
a failure on the part of the justice system, and if California follows in 
the footsteps of less meticulous states, it could be accountable for more 
of these failures.103 
Interestingly, several states in the Death Belt have a system 
similar to what Prop. 66 proposes.104 Those who are on the 
appointment list are required to take court appointments of death 
penalty cases.105 The result is often passive, substandard 
representation.106 This shows that while the Death Belt is more 
successful at carrying out timely executions, it comes at a dangerous 
price. This is a reality that California should not take lightly and may 
have to confront if it starts to regress on its standards concerning the 
death penalty system. 
2.  Implicitly Lowering Capital Appeal Qualifications 
Even if the legislature does not explicitly change the 
qualifications for the death penalty, courts may begin to use their 
discretion to allow more leeway on the discretionary provisions of 
requirements for capital appeal attorneys. California Rules of Court, 
rule 4.117 does provide a few objective requirements, such as the ten 
years of criminal experience, five serious or violent felony trials, and 
mandatory capital defense training within the last two years.107 
However, the rest of the requirements are highly subjective. For 
instance, the rule provides that attorneys must “[b]e familiar with the 
practices and procedures of the California criminal courts[,] . . . [b]e 
familiar with and experienced in the use of expert witnesses and 
evidence, including psychiatric and forensic evidence[,] . . . and . . . 
[h]ave demonstrated the necessary proficiency, diligence, and quality 
of representation appropriate to capital cases.”108 
With the demand of Prop. 66, courts are likely to feel pressured 
to be more lax about what constitutes the “necessary proficiency, 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Telephone Interview with Jack Earley, Certified Criminal Law Specialist, Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Co-Chair, Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice, President, Orange Cty. Criminal Def. Bar Ass’n 
(Feb. 1, 2018). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. CAL. R. CT. 4.117(d). 
 108. Id. 
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diligence, and quality of representation appropriate to capital 
cases.”109 After all, how can courts accurately predict whether 
attorneys possess these qualifications if the attorneys have previously 
refused to work on capital cases? This runs the risk of allowing the 
California standards for attorneys to slide towards a much lower level. 
3.  Constitutional Violations as a Result of Lower Qualifications 
for Death Penalty Defense Counsel 
If California lowers its standards and qualifications for death 
penalty defense counsel, the system will become prone to 
constitutional violations. The present status of the death penalty 
scheme already generates countless constitutional appeals; reducing 
the expectations for counsel will only exacerbate this problem by 
creating numerous violations of the Sixth Amendment effective 
assistance of counsel clause.110 The potentially lower skill level that 
may be tolerated as a result of Prop. 66 will increase the arbitrary 
nature with which death sentences are administered, thus violating the 
Eighth Amendment in a manner that is reminiscent of the problems 
during the Furman Era. 
a.  Violations of the Sixth Amendment 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives 
criminal defendants facing capital punishment the right to an 
attorney.111 This was later expanded to include criminal defendants 
who faced any felony charge.112 The meaning of the Sixth Amendment 
then came to include the right to effective assistance of counsel.113 This 
standard of effectiveness was determined by the seminal case, 
Strickland v. Washington,114 which set a high threshold.115 Under this 
standard, the attorney must have acted as an objectively reasonable 
attorney would.116 However, Strickland did not stop there. Even if the 
attorney did not act objectively reasonably, the defendant must also 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
 111. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932). 
 112. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 113. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. 
 114. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 115. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 116. Id. at 688. 
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show that the attorney’s mistakes caused him undue prejudice and 
denied him a fair trial.117 
The standard has been criticized for sanctioning too much 
discretion in ineffective assistance of counsel cases, especially in 
death penalty cases, where almost any small mistake should be 
construed as prejudicial.118 Additionally, it is easy to imagine how 
difficult it is for defendants to prove that outcomes would have been 
different had the attorneys acted differently or how they were 
specifically prejudiced. Many times, whether a mistake was 
prejudicial is up to the subjective opinion of the judge.119 
Before launching into the repercussions of inexperienced and 
unwilling attorneys taking on death penalty cases, it is important to 
highlight why specialized and experienced lawyers are crucial for 
effective assistance in these cases and just how uniquely challenging 
capital appeals are. Aside from the emotional burden of having a 
human life on the line, death penalty cases present novel and complex 
processes and issues. It has been understood by experienced defense 
attorneys, scholars, and the United States Supreme Court that “death 
is different.”120 The exceptional complexities and difficulties of 
capital cases have caused some to deem it “perhaps the most 
technically difficult form of litigation known to the American legal 
system.”121 Not only is there the arduous emotional and moral toll of 
being the only thing that stands between a defendant and a lethal 
injection, but the unique issues that arise, as well as the massive 
 
 117. Id. at 687. 
 118. Amy R. Murphy, The Constitutional Failure of the Strickland Standard in Capital Cases 
Under the Eighth Amendment, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 (2000). 
 119. Id. at 180. 
 120. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting that 
“death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal 
justice”). 
 121. The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, supra note 
99, at 1925; see also ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel 
in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 95, at 923 (“More than seventy years later, death penalty cases 
have become so specialized that defense counsel have duties and functions definably different from 
those of counsel in ordinary criminal cases.”); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective 
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 317 (1983) (“[B]ecause of 
both the special procedures . . . and the uniqueness of death as a punishment, defense counsel has 
additional responsibilities in capital cases that are unlike those of counsel in all other criminal 
trials.”). 
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investigative efforts that are necessary, are unprecedented by any other 
type of criminal case.122 
The most distinctive and important difference in death penalty 
cases is the bifurcation of the trial: one trial to determine guilt and 
another to determine whether the death penalty should be 
implemented, often called the penalty phase.123 To provide a strong 
case for mitigation to life without parole at the penalty phase, the 
defense attorney must step into the role of an investigator to uncover 
any and all circumstances in the defendant’s history which may 
convince the jury to spare him or her.124 Counsel may present evidence 
of abuse as a child, abuse by the victim, or by any other outside force 
which may help explain the crimes committed.125 Particular hardships 
or traumatic circumstances in the defendant’s life may be used to 
humanize the defendant.126 The defense usually hires a “mitigation 
specialist” who the defense attorney may use in private or elicit 
testimony from on the stand.127 Additionally, specialists are essential 
to investigate mental health issues if there is a possibility of an insanity 
defense.128 
The ability to present mitigating evidence has proved to be 
absolutely crucial for many defendants.129 The importance of 
mitigating evidence was recognized by the ABA in its Supplementary 
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death 
Penalty Cases.130 These guidelines enumerated the duties of defense 
attorneys and the comprehensive scale at which defense attorneys 
must investigate their client’s life story.131 While Prop. 66 focuses on 
the appointment of counsel on subsequent appeals rather than trial 
counsel,132 it is equally necessary that the appellate counsel 
understands the unique penalty phase so that they can investigate 
 
 122. Goodpaster, supra note 121, at 317. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 317–18. 
 125. See id. at 319–20, n.106. 
 126. Id. 
 127. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, supra note 95, at 959–60 (explaining the importance of mitigation specialists). 
 128. See ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in 
Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 677 (2008). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 680–81. 
 132. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
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whether a potential mistake was made during the trial. This often 
creates a complex mixture of factual and legal disputes. A less 
experienced attorney who has never examined a bifurcated death 
penalty trial may not detect important issues and nuances that could 
make a compelling case. 
Due to the unique and specialized set of skills required to provide 
effective assistance of counsel in a death penalty case, Prop. 66 
increases the prospect of Sixth Amendment violations. Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are amongst the most common claims on 
appeal following death sentences and are already a major cause of 
delay.133 If the prevalence of these appeals is already high with the 
present standards of defense counsel qualifications, it only seems to 
follow logically that they will proliferate when Prop. 66 forces courts 
to lower expectations and inexperienced, unwilling attorneys begin to 
take on death penalty cases. 
Consequently, the increased likelihood of ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims will only further bog down the system and prolong 
the time it takes to reach an execution. To solve the lack of quality, 
qualified counsel, California must fund defense counsel properly—not 
attempt to lower important standards that protect inmates’ 
constitutional rights. Although Prop. 66 has attempted to alleviate the 
lack of willing and qualified attorneys, it seems as though there is a 
great risk that this attempt may backfire. While Prop. 66 will likely 
encourage qualification standards to drop, the standards that the Sixth 
Amendment sets for effective assistance of counsel will not. This 
mismatch will plague the death penalty system in California with 
further constitutional violations. 
b.  Violations of the Eighth Amendment 
Lowering the qualifications for death penalty attorneys and 
forcing unwilling and inexperienced attorneys who are seemingly 
“qualified” under California Rules of Court, rule 4.117 will not only 
increasingly violate the Sixth Amendment, but also increase the 
arbitrary nature of death sentences in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”134 While this is a broad phrase, the United 
 
 133. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 125. 
 134. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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States Supreme Court has stated that the standard of what qualifies as 
cruel and unusual punishment evolves as the “public opinion becomes 
enlightened by humane justice.”135 This stands for the principle that 
the scope of what is cruel and unusual punishment develops with the 
evolution of modern, public standards of morality.136 In Furman, the 
arbitrary imposition of death sentences was deemed to fall within the 
modern scope of what was cruel and unusual, but was then rectified 
by Gregg.137 Under Prop. 66, however, California’s death sentence 
system will likely fall within that scope again. 
For years, members of the legal community have argued that “[i]t 
is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal representation, that 
distinguishes [cases], where the death penalty was imposed, from 
many similar cases, where it was not.”138 The “cruel and unusual 
punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment was largely the cause 
of the Supreme Court’s de facto moratorium in the 1970s.139 The 
decision in Furman highlighted the fact that the death penalty was 
being applied in an unacceptably arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. 
While the concerns in Furman were seemingly quelled by requiring a 
mandatory scheme of aggravating factors to reinstate death penalty 
statutes, lowering the qualifications for death penalty defense 
attorneys runs the risk of restoring the arbitrariness of the death 
penalty, depending upon which attorney the defendant happens to 
get.140 
This problem is not new. Many have recognized that the 
difference between life and death for many defendants comes down to 
the lawyer they get. Even Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg 
acknowledges that seemingly the sole factor determining the 
application of the death penalty is the quality of defense attorneys: 
“People who are well represented at trial do not get the death 
penalty . . . . I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming 
 
 135. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
344, 378 (1910)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 
(1972) (Brennan, J. concurring). 
 138. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but 
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994). 
 139. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 991–92. 
 140. Furman, 408 U.S. at 281; Bright, supra note 138, at 1837. 
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to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which 
the defendant was well represented at trial.”141 
Of course, it could be argued that this is the case for any 
conviction—if you have a good lawyer you get off, if you have a bad 
lawyer you don’t. However, there is an unusually strong connection 
between the abilities of death penalty attorneys and the imposition of 
capital sentences.142 This is likely because of the unique nature of the 
penalty phase, and the specialized set of skills attorneys require to 
provide an effective defense. Once a defendant is found guilty and 
eligible for the death penalty, the penalty phase can be very fickle.143 
It often comes down to how well the attorney can humanize or muster 
mercy and sympathy for the defendant.144 Whereas, in a non-capital 
case, attorneys are much more likely to run into familiar issues and 
root their arguments in objective elements of a crime, once a statutory 
special circumstance is met, the penalty phase is largely up to the 
discretion of the jury.145 
The sole determining factor of whether a defendant is sentenced 
to execution should not be his attorney, just as the Supreme Court 
determined it should not be the color of his skin in Furman.146 
However, the correlation between adequate representation and the 
imposition of death sentences is a reality that California must grapple 
with and provide safeguards for. Given the strong correlation between 
poor defense attorneys and death sentences,147 it is imperative that 
California maintains a strong standard of qualifications for these 
attorneys. Lowering the qualifications or forcing inexperienced 
attorneys to take on these appeals will potentially reinstate the 
concerns in Furman. Allowing the pool of attorneys eligible for 
appointment to include a wide swath of skill makes it so that the 
defendant’s fate is up to the luck of the draw. If they get a good 
 
 141. Statements on the Death Penalty by Supreme Court Justices, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/statements-death-penalty-supreme-court-justices#ginsburg (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 142. See The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, supra 
note 99, at 1928. 
 143. See Goodpaster, supra note 121, at 334–39 (discussing the intricacies of the penalty 
phase). 
 144. Id. at 335. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972).  
 147. Bright, supra note 138, at 1836. 
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attorney, his or her life will likely be spared. If, however, he or she 
gets a new attorney, who has begrudgingly accepted a death penalty 
defense case so that they can remain on the appointment list, they may 
have much lower hope of surviving. 
The risk of Eighth Amendment violations is not only concerning 
from a due process standpoint, but also from a practical one. If inmates 
have the opportunity to file more constitutional appeals, the system 
will continue to get clogged with an unmanageable amount of appeals. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Meaningful reform must take place to solve the problems with the 
current death penalty system. California must invest additional money 
into creating a workable and constitutional death penalty system. 
Reforms may include increasing the pay and resources for capital 
appeal appointed defense counsel and creating a judicial body that is 
solely tasked with adjudicating death penalty cases. 
A.  Altering the Pay Scheme for Capital Defense Attorneys 
and Increasing Defense Resources 
Although it was not crafted properly, Prop. 66 was indeed onto 
something by attempting to increase the number of attorneys who 
would take on capital cases in order to speed up executions.148 Waiting 
for the court to find and appoint appropriate counsel is one of the main 
causes of delay in capital cases.149 Inmates may sit on death row for 
over five years before counsel is appointed.150 The answer, however, 
does not lie in forcing a nonexistent group of attorneys to 
begrudgingly take on capital cases for pittance. Instead, California 
should seek to increase the number of qualified attorneys by funding 
defense efforts properly and making capital defense work more 
attractive. 
Practitioners agree that death penalty defense is often 
underfunded.151 Effective attorneys who devote the necessary amount 
of hours to their case often submit a bill to the court for their 
compensation, but are only reimbursed for a fraction of the actual 
 
 148. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
 149. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S47. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. 
(6) 52.3_COSTEA (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  11:14 PM 
2019] CALIFORNIA PROP. 66 & THE DEATH PENALTY 267 
 
hours they put in.152 It becomes clear, then, why the majority of 
lawyers who agree to take on death penalty cases must be passionate 
and invested in the cause. 
Many capital defense attorneys are adamant abolitionists who are 
passionate about the cause and are willing to take on death penalty 
cases even though they know they may not be compensated 
properly.153 While this is commendable, there are simply not enough 
attorneys willing to take on the emotional burden, and financial 
setback, of a capital case out of political or moral convictions alone. If 
California were to alter the pay scheme for appointed death penalty 
attorneys and provide a substantial amount of additional resources, 
more defense attorneys may be willing to take on the cases. This again 
highlights the point that attorneys who only take death penalty cases 
as a result of Prop. 66’s threat to take them off the appointment list 
will likely not be willing to put in the number of hours required to 
provide effective assistance, as they know that they will only be 
compensated for a fraction of those hours. 
The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
suggested a number of reforms to make a workable death penalty.154 
In order to “address the unavailability of qualified, competent 
attorneys” the Commission recommended that California: (1) expand 
the Office of the State Public Defender; (2) expand the Habeas Corpus 
Resource Center; (3) increase the staff of the Offices of the Attorney 
General; and (4) increase funding made available to the California 
Supreme Court.155 Additionally, the Commission recommended that 
funds be allocated to counties so that they can fully reimburse 
payments to counsel for defense services, that the current limitations 
on funding for the expense of homicide trials be reconsidered, and 
that: 
California counties provide adequate funding for the 
appointment for the performance of trial counsel in death 
penalty cases . . . . In all cases, attorneys must be fully 
compensated at rates that are commensurate with the 
provision of high quality legal representation and reflect the 
 
 152. Id. at S97. 
 153. Telephone Interview with Jack Earley, supra note 104. 
 154. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 116–17. 
 155. Id. 
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extraordinary responsibilities in death penalty 
representation.156 
Prop. 66 implemented none of these recommendations.157 With 
current funding, attorneys are faced with choosing to put in adequate 
time and be undercompensated, or only putting in the amount of time 
they think they will be compensated for, which will likely not be 
enough to effectively defend their client.158 The Commission 
estimated that implementing its recommendations would increase the 
annual cost of the death penalty from $137 million to $232.7 
million.159 A starting point may also be to raise the pay of state 
attorneys to the $175 hourly rate that federal capital appeal counsel 
receives.160 Currently, state counsel usually bid for a flat rate that often 
only covers a fraction of the funds necessary to properly defend their 
death penalty cases.161 This will cost taxpayers at least $85 million per 
year alone.162 Voters may be angered and shocked when confronted 
with realistic numbers of what it would take to fix the system, 
especially when initiatives such as Prop. 66 have overpromised results 
without additional funding. 
An additional way to guarantee sufficient funds would be to 
implement a principle of equitable defense in death penalty cases. 
There is a large disparity between the amount of resources that are 
allotted to prosecutors versus indigent defense counsel.163 Part of this 
disparity likely comes from the fact that the people’s right to state 
funded prosecution of criminals in California has been present in 
society since the state was founded.164 Public defense, however, was 
much more of an uphill battle. The right to assistance of counsel for 
indigent defendants was not recognized in death penalty cases until 
 
 156. Id. at 117. 
 157. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016). 
 158. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 116–17. 
 159. Id. at 117. 
 160. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S214–15. 
 161. See id. at S80–81. 
 162. Id. at S215. 
 163. See CTY. OF L.A., COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 2017–18 FINAL ADOPTED BUDGET, 
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lac/1037208_2017-18FinalAdoptedBudgetCharts.pdf (allocating 
2,216 positions to the District Attorney and only 1,159 to the Public Defender). 
 164. Office History, L.A. CTY. DIST. ATTY’S OFFICE, http://da.co.la.ca.us/about/history (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2018). 
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1932165 and was not incorporated to the states until 1963.166 Still, since 
then, the public budget seems to always prioritize prosecution over 
defense.167 The author proposes that when the death penalty is on the 
table, prosecution and defense should be provided with equal 
resources. If California is willing to execute someone, it should also 
be willing to invest an equal amount into his or her defense. It will 
come down to whether California wants to invest the degree of 
resources required to carry out the death penalty in a constitutional 
manner. 
B.  Creating a Separate Death Penalty Court 
Another practical solution would be to create a specialized death 
penalty court. This would ensure that there is a judicial body that is 
solely held accountable for the state of the death penalty system. 
Additionally, the judges and staff of this court would be uniquely 
accustomed to death penalty issues, so that they could more efficiently 
adjudicate the matters. 
Although this option is a massive change and would require a 
great deal of legislation, a subject-specific court is not inconceivable. 
Other areas with unique issues and ramifications have merited their 
own court. At the federal level there is the Federal Circuit that deals 
exclusively with patent suits, the United States Bankruptcy Courts, 
United States Tax Courts, United States Courts of International Trade, 
United States Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.168 In various states 
there are specialized drug courts, dependency courts, domestic 
violence courts, juvenile courts, truancy courts, mental health courts, 
probate courts, and the list goes on.169 Something as important as life 
or death should also fall into the category of meriting its own court if 
the death penalty is to continue. 
 
 165. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
 166. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 167. See CTY. OF L.A., supra note 163. 
 168. MARKUS, B. ZIMMER, INT’L JOURNAL FOR COURT ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF SPECIALIZED 
COURTS 8–11 (Aug. 2009), http://www.iaca.ws/files/LWB-SpecializedCourts.pdf. 
 169. Specialized Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/specialized-courts.aspx (Mar. 13, 2013). 
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V.  JUSTIFICATION AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Additional resources and funding will allow death penalty cases 
to be heard and adjudicated more quickly while preserving a 
constitutional system. The vast investment this system would require, 
however, may not be worth the tenuous societal benefits that the death 
penalty offers. 
A.  A Practical and Constitutional Death Penalty System 
Is Not Possible Without Additional Funding 
The only tenable solution to significantly and sustainably 
improve the death penalty system would require a sizeable investment 
of taxpayer dollars.170 If the legislature were to increase pay for death 
penalty attorneys and/or create a separate court for death penalty 
cases, the public may see an increase in efficiency. Whether this is an 
advisable use of public funds should be left up to the voters by 
generating a realistic funding proposal to accompany Prop. 66. 
The unfortunate and unsatisfying truth is that, with the current 
budget, what the California public desires is impossible. The only 
thing that could potentially make a real change to the death penalty 
system is pouring millions of additional resources into it. Going on as 
we have is not a sustainable option. The mistake California has made 
is in thinking that Prop. 66 will indeed fix its problems for free. 
Without more resources, there are two options: a system that executes 
inmates quicker while compromising accuracy and heightening the 
potential of killing innocent people or, what we already have, a system 
that takes an unreasonable amount of time to execute inmates but seeks 
to preserve accuracy by utilizing all possible precautionary methods 
and appeals. Prop. 66 is a poorly devised shortcut solution because 
voters and politicians have yet to accept that a real solution under the 
current budget is untenable. 
B.  Public Policy Considerations 
While additional funding would help effectuate the goals of Prop. 
66, there are considerations as to whether the allocation of additional 
funding would substantially benefit the public interest. The dollar 
 
 170. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 117. 
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amount that it would take to maintain an efficient and constitutional 
death penalty system continues to grow while the rationale for 
sustaining the death penalty dwindles. The dollar amount it would take 
to properly fund an efficient death penalty system takes away from 
funds that may be needed and better used elsewhere. 
1.  Deterring Attorneys from Remaining on the Appointment List 
Fears have been expressed that instead of increasing the number 
of attorneys to work on death penalty cases, Prop. 66 may provide a 
disincentive for attorneys to stay on the appointment list altogether.171 
Not only would this defeat the goal of Prop. 66, but it would also have 
a negative impact on the criminal indigent defense programs in 
California as a whole. Additionally, there is also a risk that the 
pressure to eliminate the backlog on death row may bring the 
California courts to a standstill in terms of adjudicating other civil and 
criminal matters. This, in itself, may foster violations of other parties’ 
rights to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.172 
2.  Would the Potential Investment Be Worth It? 
It seems impractical to invest billions173 of taxpayer dollars to 
maintain a form of punishment that is disfavored by nearly half of the 
population of California and does not provide substantially more 
benefits than life without parole. 
As far as practicality, life without parole takes criminals off the 
street so that they are no longer a threat, and a life left to languish in 
prison is a harsh punishment fit for atrocious crimes that would 
otherwise merit capital sentences. There is little evidence that death 
sentences have a significant deterrent effect on crime.174 In fact, there 
have been mixed reports as to whether the families of the victims even 
benefit from the purported sense of closure that executing the inmate 
is supposed to impart.175 Many victims’ families report feeling a sense 
of guilt afterwards.176 
 
 171. Donohue, supra note 10. 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 173. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S65. 
 174. See Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, 872 F.3d 1047, 1063–64, nn.4–5 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that 
death sentences alone, without an execution, do little to deter crime). 
 175. See id. at 1064. 
 176. Id. 
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Over the past forty years, California has spent $4 billion on a 
death penalty that has executed just thirteen inmates.177 That $4 billion 
could have been used toward a more proven method in reducing crime: 
employing more law enforcement.178 In this time span, California 
could have employed over fifty-eight thousand more police officers 
with the money used towards a completely ineffectual death 
penalty.179 The additional law enforcement could have prevented 
roughly seven hundred additional murders.180 A death penalty that 
adopted the proper reform proposals suggested above would cost 
$232.7 million per year, whereas a system that eliminated the death 
penalty in favor of life without parole would cost $11.5 million 
annually.181 Figures such as this make it difficult justify pouring vast 
amounts of additional funding into death penalty efforts. 
Perhaps the state should focus on redirecting that money into 
social programs that benefit low-income and minority families, as 
these are the demographics that are disparately represented on death 
row. A shift toward preventing the surroundings that have been proven 
to foster the development of violent criminals, rather than 
implementing the harshest punishment possible once the crimes 
happen, could benefit society to a greater degree. The money could be 
used for afterschool programs to give children in impoverished areas 
an alternative to joining gangs, in the foster system to create a healthier 
environment for children with no family, or in social services so that 
the incredible caseload for social workers could be alleviated so they 
would be able to devote more attention to individual cases. The list 
could go on, but it seems logical to recognize that there are other areas 
that could benefit and ultimately better serve society with billions of 
dollars in public resources. 
As tempting as it is to label the inmates on death row as monsters, 
there is some truth in the tenet that “[m]ost criminals are not born, they 
are made.”182 While it may not be that black and white, there is value 
in recognizing that at least part of the evolution of a violent criminal 
 
 177. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S111; Wagstaff, supra note 5. 
 178. See Donohue, supra note 10. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 147. 
 182. MRS. FREMONT OLDER, WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST, AMERICAN 450 (D. Appleton-
Century Co. 1936). 
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is a reflection of their societal conditions. Many inmates become 
violent as a result of years of abuse and violence at home, through 
traumatic events, or in response to emotional and physical cruelty.183 
A large portion of people in prison were abused as children, 
brought up in reprehensible circumstances, and endured an amount of 
suffering that no one would envy before turning to crime and 
violence.184 The correlation between childhood abuse and violent 
crime is astounding; a child that is neglected and abused is at least 
three times more likely to engage in violent crime.185 Clearly, 
repealing the death penalty would not put an end to violent crime as 
we know it. It would, however, be a step in the right direction toward 
refocusing our budget and our attention toward preventing the type of 
environment where these crimes flourish rather than spending billions 
of dollars on an unfeasible and draconian form of punishment once 
they have happened. 
Nevertheless, if this is what California voters want, they are 
democratically entitled to it. However, voters need a realistic plan of 
how to fix the death penalty system, not another ballot initiative with 
empty promises. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the voters of California, the decision seems easy. Someone 
who commits an unspeakable, atrocious crime no longer deserves to 
live. However, for the judiciary and those in charge of managing the 
death penalty system, the decisions along the way cause great inner 
turmoil. The voters want a death penalty, but when faced with the 
practical constraints of a legal system susceptible to human error, the 
court second-guesses itself. The voters want to make the people who 
committed these atrocities pay, but then the judges who hear the 
appeals waver when confronted with the uncertainties of a fact-
sensitive, emotion-laden jury trial. The voters want to fulfill a gritty 
sense of retribution, to send out a deterring message that in California 
you pay for what you have done. But then, the court takes a nervous 
 
 183. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY 
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 3 (1999), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/parip.pdf. 
 184. Id. at 2–3. 
 185. Diane J. English et al., Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and 
Violent Criminal Behavior: A Replication and Extension, Final Report, NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE 33–34 (Feb. 1, 2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/192291.pdf. 
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step back when it sees how easily a trial can veer in one direction or 
the other based on a skilled cross-examination, an inexperienced 
witness, or a nuanced legal fine point. 
The erratic history of the death penalty, the halt it has come to, 
and the recent attempts of Prop. 66 to fix it only reveal the deep-seeded 
truth that while the voters of California may say that they want a death 
penalty, the law cannot come to terms with its fatal pitfalls. While they 
so badly want the satisfaction of reprisal, and of closure for the 
victims’ families, the judiciary’s conscience is dragged down by those 
lingering questions: What if the defense attorney had ordered a mental 
health evaluation? What if he had called that witness? What if he had 
introduced that fact? Can any error be “harmless” when someone’s life 
is on the line? Perhaps this is why California is where it is today, stuck 
in a fog of obscure legal battles and naive reform propositions. 
Because as much as voters say they want a death penalty, the court is 
always stopped by the inevitable and communal pit in its stomach; that 
is, if there was a mistake made along the way, the ability to rectify it 
perishes along with the inmate. 
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